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The Fourth Circuit also addressed the constitutionality of
Coleman's sentence. The Court stated that a jury trial is not constitu-
tionally required for imposition of the death penalty, and that the
determination of its appropriateness may be made by an appellate
court. Id. at 13 (citing Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 106 S. CL
689, 88 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1986)).
In Cabana, however, the issue was whether, on substantive
Eighth Amendment grounds, defendant was a mere accomplice who
did not kill, or intend death and was therefore in a constitutionally
protected class of defendants as defined by Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982). The main issue
in Cabana was at what point in the criminal process an Ennund
finding must be made. Cabana, at 382. The United States Supreme
Court determined that such a finding did not require ajury and that
an appellate court could constitutionally determine whether the death
penalty was permissible under Enmund. Id. at 385, 386.
The Fourth Circuit's reliance on Cabana is curious. The
Fourth Circuit read Cabana as authority for an appellate court to
determine in place of the jury the proper application of the vileness
aggravating factor and then to impose the death penalty. Coleman, at
13. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that an
appellate court may not simply review the circumstances of the crime
and decide on its own that they are sufficient to make out this
aggravating factor. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363, 108 S.
Ct. 1853, 1857, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372,377 (1988). Since Maynard dealt
with the very issue raised by Coleman, it would appear to be the more
appropriate authority.
As shown by this opinion, state and federal appellate courts
require STRICT' compliance with procedural rules. Virginia practitio-
ners should note that, unlike Coleman, most appeals to the Supreme
Court of Virginia involve several claims which the court may reject
on the merits or find to be waived or defaulted. Habeas counsel
should note that for a state to invoke the doctrine of procedural
default, "[T]he state court's opinion [MUST] contain a plain
statement that its decision rests upon adequate and independent state
grounds."' Coleman, at 5 (quoting Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038,
1042 (1989) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042
(1983)). Also, counsel should note that any discrepancies or ambigui-
ties regarding this point should be resolved in favor of permitting
federal jurisdiction and review. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
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FACTS
This is Timothy Wilson Spencer's third capital murder trial
and appeal. Spencer I and Spencer II have been discussed in 2
CapitalDefense Digest 13, (Nov. 1989).
Spencer was convicted of capital murder, i.e., willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder during the commission of or
subsequent to rape, of Dr. Susan Hellams. Dr. Hellams' wrists had
been tied behind her back with electrical tape. Death occurred by
"ligature strangulation." Other injuries such as a fractured nose and
marks indicating that she had been kicked with the edge of a shoe
were found. Spencer 111, 385 S.E.2d at 852. Spermatozoa were
discovered on swabs taken from the victim's vagina, rectum, and
perianal region, as well as from fluid found on the victim's skirt and
slip. Id. Serological examination revealed that the seminal fluid was
consistent with a type 0 secretor. Both Hellams and her husband
were found to be non-secretors. Id. A sample of Spencer's blood
revealed that he was a "type 0 secretor, PGM type 1, PGM subtype
1+, and peptidase A type 1." Id. However, 13% of the population
have this particular combination of blood types. Id. As in Spencer I
and Spencer I, DNA molecules from Spencer's blood sample were
compared with DNA molecules from the seminal fluid, and were
found to match. Id. at 853. No two individuals except for identical
twins have the same DNA patterns. Id. at n.1.
HOLDING
At trial, Spencer challenged the constitutionality of the death
penalty. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this claim. Id. at 853.
Spencer also contended that the death penalty statute was "vague"
and does not specify which party carries the burden of proof of
mitigation. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this claim as not
having been raised at trial. Id. at 854, n.3. Spencer also challenged
the exclusion of venireperson Maureen Owens. The Virginia
Supreme Court found no error in the exclusion of Owens. Id. at 854-
5. The most significant holdings were those turning aside Spencer's
challenges to the critical DNA evidence.
ANALYSIS
In this case, the "conventional" serological evidence showed
only that the rapist-murderer was a "type-O secretor." Blood tests
performed upon Spencer showed him to belong to this type. Since
13% of the population are type-O secretors, this evidence was
insufficient to prove that Spencer had committed the rape. Id. at 852.
In the absence of other forensic evidence, the DNA matching was
necessary to show that Spencer had perpetrated the crime. The
probability of error in the DNA matching process used to compare
the DNA from Spencer's blood sample to the DNA in the seminal
fluids recovered from the victim is alleged to have been one in
705,000,000. Id. at 853, n.2. Expert witnesses testified as to the
accuracy and reliability of the test. "Dr. Roberts testified unequivo-
cally that there was no disagreement in the scientific community
about the reliability of DNA print testing." Id. at 854. DNA print
testing was first at issue in Virginia as a forensic technique in
Spencer I and I, where the Virginia Supreme Court held that "DNA
testing is a reliable scientific technique." Id. at 855.
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Spencer's assignment
of error complaining of the trial court's limitations on the cross-
examination of Dr. Roberts. The Court noted that Spencer made no
proffer of his questions or the answers the witness would have given.
Id.
Significantly, the Court also noted that Spencer did not dispute
that the DNA testing was properly conducted. As noted above,
conventional analysis of the seminal fluid and Spencer's blood
samples did no more than allow him to be considered as a suspect; it
was the DNA matching that provided virtually conclusive evidence
of his guilt. The defense presented no evidence in the guilt phase of
the trial. Id. at 853. In other words, defense counsel made no
significant challenge to the DNA matching test procedure in general
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or to the tests which the Commonwealth used to link Spencer to the
murder. There is, however, at least one recent example of successful
employment of the latter line of defense against DNA evidence.
In People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989), a successful
challenge to the DNA matching test linking Castro to a murder was
made. The evidence linking Castro to the murder victim consisted of
bloodstains on his wristwatch. Castro at 985. Lifecodes Corp.
performed a DNA matching test on DNA from the bloodstains on the
wristwatch and determined that they matched those of the victim. Id.
at 985-6. Castro's attorney, Peter Neufeld, fielded a team of five
expert witnesses to challenge the Lifecodes data. Id. at 986. Eventu-
ally, although the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the DNA
matching test was a valid procedure, it questioned the reliability of
the actual procedure used in this case.
The rule for declaring a measured match must be the
same rule which is used for declaring a match between
the measurements and the data pool. This was not
done In this case. Because of this error, the popula-
tion frequencies reported by Lifecodes In this case
are not generally accepted by the scientific
community. This mistake might have been corrected
by remeasuring the bands, rematching them to the data
pool, and then recalculating the allele frequencies.
However, this procedure was not undertaken In
this case. Accordingly, the statistical probabilities
noted would have been precluded or substantially
redued ...
Castro at 998 (emphasis added). The New York Court of Appeals
found that this rendered the results so unreliable that they were
"inadmissible as a matter of law." Id. at 999.
Castro illustrates the dangers inherent in "infallible" methods
of identification. No analytical technique is any more reliable than
the technician performing the procedure or the sample being
analyzed. Further, the more complicated the procedure, the greater
the need for safeguards to ensure reliability. An article in the
December 1989 issue of Student Lawyer (Williams, "Conviction by
Chromosome," p. 26) quotes Edward Lander, an expert witness for
the defense in Castro, on the need for greater reliability in forensic
testing: "At present, forensic science is virtually unregulated - with
the paradoxical result that clinical laboratories must meet higher
standards to be allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs
must meet to put a defendant on death row."
Ultimately, concentration on the reliability of particular,
complicated forensic testing showed in Castro that Lifecodes' own
test results excluded defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. Castro
at 998.
It is suggested that Virginia attorneys faced with DNA
matching test evidence study the Castro opinion. Although highly
technical, it provides a readable and detailed explanation of the entire
matching procedure and illustrates how the procedures were
successfully challenged in that particular case. The opinion also lists
numerous articles and learned treatises upon the subject. For these
reasons it is an excellent starting place for research.
CRITICAL POINTS IN THE PROGRESS OF A CAPITAL CASE
By: Elizabeth A. Bennett
I. Introduction
In the progress of capital as compared with non-capital tfials,
there are points at which the capital trial presents unique challenges
and responsibilities for defense counsel. In addition, there are points
where the importance of matter also present in non-capital trials is
enhanced. This article does not undertake exhaustive treatment of
those points, it merely identifies them-some are also discussed
elsewhere in this issue.
I1. Pretrial Motions: Unique Resource Requirements In
Capital Cases.
A. Securing Time and Resources
1. Mental Mitigation
a. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Supp. 1989).
This section provides for the mandatory appointment of a
mental health expert upon a showing that defendant is indigent and
either has been charged with or convicted of capital murder. The
function of the mental health expert is to evaluate the capital
defendant and to assist in the preparation and presentation of
evidence in mitigation to be presented during the sentencing phase of
the trial. An alternative means of securing the assistance is to obtain
appointment under the Constitutional authority originating in Ake v.
Oklahoma'. Under Ake, however, a substantial showing is required
by the defendant. The burden of making this showing must be
weighed against the significant disadvantages which arise when
defendant moves under § 19.2-264.3:1. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.3:1 compels a capital defendant to waive his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by submitting to examination by
an expert appointed for the Commonwealth, furnish that expert with
reports containing statements made by the defendant to his expert, or
face possible preclusion of the testimony of his expert2 at the capital
penalty trial.
b. Ake v. Oklahoma
1. Introduction
As will be seen in the following sections, Ake is not only
authority for securing expert mental mitigation assistance, but may
also authorize other expert assistance deemed to constitute "basic
tools" of an effective defense.
While the showing required under Ake is substantial, counsel
should be permitted to make it exparte. This is premised upon the
fact that this showing cannot be made without revealing defense
theories or other privileged undiscoverable material to the Common-
wealth. Clearly this information would not be discoverable from a
defendant who could afford to retain his own expert. One benefit of
pursuing the Ake process is that it forces counsel to develop a theory
of mitigation in order to show what defensive matters, particular to
the case, require expert assistance for their preparation and presenta-
tion.
Counsel should consider moving on both constitutional and
statutory grounds. First, counsel could make the Ake motion,
supported by the exparte showing. If appointment is denied, a
motion under § 19.2-264.3:1 could follow, with appropriate objection
